I. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We have four substantive criticisms of the Harberger approach: (i) In the partial equilibrium formula for welfare loss 2dpdq, where dp is the change in price from competition to monopoly and dq is the change in quantity, dp and dq were considered to be independent of each other. Generally low values of dp were observed and low values of dq were assumed. In Harberger's case he assumed that price elasticities of demand in all industries were unitary. This must inevitably lead to small estimates of welfare loss.
(2) The competitive profit rate was identified with the mean profit rate and thus automatically incorporated an element of monopoly. In fact the underlying approach was a " constant degree of monopoly" -one in which distortions in output were associated with deviations of profit rate from the mean, rather than from the competitive return on capital.
(3) The use of industry profit rates introduces an immediate aggregation bias into the calculation by allowing the high monopoly profits of those firms with the most market power to be offset by the losses of other firms in the same industry. Given assumption (I), a further aggregation bias is introduced, which can easily be shown to result in additional downward bias in the estimates.
(4) The entire social loss due to monopoly was assumed to arise from the deviation of monopoly output from competitive levels. To this should be added the social cost of attempts to acquire monopoly pcsitions, existing or potential.
We now seek to justify each of these four criticisms.
(A) Interdependence of dpi and dqi Assuming profit maximising behaviour we can define the implied price elasticity of demand for a specific firm by observing the mark-up of price on marginal cost:
vi Pi/(Pi-mci).
For a pure monopolist or perfectly colluding oligopolist ^ is the industry elasticity of demand. In other cases ^i reflects both the industry demand elas-
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ticity and the degree of rivals' response to a change in price the ith firm perceives (Cubbin, I975) . Using (i) we shall obtain welfare loss estimates by individual firms from their price/cost margins. These estimates indicate the amount of welfare loss associated with a single firm's decision to set price above marginal cost, given the change in its output implied by Ji.1 To the extent other firms also charge higher prices, because firm i sets its price above marginal cost, the total welfare loss associated with firm i's market power exceeds the welfare loss we estimate. To the extent that a simultaneous reduction to zero of all price cost margins is contemplated, however, Ji overestimates the net effect of the reduction in pi on the ith firm's output. What the latter effect on output and welfare would be is a matter for general equilibrium analysis and is not the focus here. Rather, we attempt an estimate of the relative importance of the distortions in individual firm outputs, on a firm by firm basis, on the assumption that each does possess some monopoly power, as implied by the price cost margin it chooses, and uses it. This approach emphasising the interdependence of observed price distortions and changes in output contrasts with the methodology of Harberger (I954), Schwartzman (I960), Worcester (I973) and Bergson (I973), who observe (or, in Bergson's case, assume) (p -mci)/pi and then assume a value of yt.2 Harberger observed generally low values of dpi and yet chose to assume that iqi = i, and therefore that dqi was also very small. But, it is inconsistent to observe low values of dp, and infer low elasticities unless one has assumed that the firm or industry cannot price as a monopolist, i.e. unless one has already assumed the monopoly problem away. dW, = fpiqit4 (5) where ti = dp/pi, at = I It is obvious that if ti is small the welfare loss is going to be insignificant. If ti were a price increase due to tariff or tax then it might be assumed to be independent of qi, and equation (5) allowed himself to pick some combinations of ti and yi, which implied high values of welfare loss.
Harberger defended his choice of a demand elasticity of i-o across all products on the grounds that what was "envisage[d was] not the substitution of one industry's product against all other products, but rather the substitution of one great aggregate of products (those yielding high rates of return) for another aggregate (those yielding low rates of return) " (p. 79). Thus, the use of y = I *o was an attempt at compensating for the disadvantages of employing a partial equilibrium measure of welfare loss to examine a general equilibrium structural change. But certainly this is a very awkward way of handling the problem which neither answers the criticisms raised by Bergson (I973) against the partial equilibrium approach, nor those we have just presented. For this reason we have chosen to define the partial equilibrium methodology properly and obtain the best estimates we can with this approach, recognising that it leaves unanswered the issues raised by general equilibrium analysis and the theory of second best regarding the net effect of a simultaneous elimination of all monopoly power. We return to this point below in Subsection E.
(B) The Measurement of Monopoly Profits
The obvious measure of monopoly profit is the excess of actual profits over long-run competitive returns. For an economy in equilibrium, the competitive profit rate is the minimum profit rate compatible with long-run survival, after making appropriate allowances for risk. Monopoly profit is thus the difference between actual profits and profits consistent with this minimum rate.
Harberger (I954) and all subsequent studies have based their monopoly profit estimates on the size of the deviation between actual profit rates and the mean rate. To the extent that observed profits contain elements of monopoly I978] THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY POWER 731 rent, the mean profit rate exceeds the minimum rate consistent with long-run survival. The deviations between profit rates above the mean and the mean rate underestimate the level of monopoly returns, and the estimate of monopoly welfare is biased downwards.' Indeed, if all firms and industries were in longrun equilibrium, all would earn profits equal to or greater than the minimum and the use of deviations from the mean would minimize the size of the measured monopoly profits. It is unreasonable to assume that the time periods investigated in Harberger's study, the others which followed, or our own, are long enough or stable enough so that all firms and industries are in equilibrium. The presence of firms earning profits less than the competitive norm creates a methodological problem for a study of monopoly welfare losses. All studies to date have implicitly assumed that a monopolist's costs are the same as those of a firm in competitive equilibrium, and that all welfare loss is from the loss of consumers' surplus from a monopoly price above marginal cost. But, what is the appropriate assumption to make for a firm experiencing losses? It seems unrealistic to assume that its costs are at competitive levels and its prices below them. More reasonable seems the assumption that these firms are in disequilibrium, probably with costs currently above competitive levels. When calculating monopoly welfare losses, therefore, we simply drop all firms (or industries where relevant) with profits below the competitive return on capital, in effect assuming that they will eventually return to a position where they are earning normal profits or disappear. In either case, they represent no long-run loss to society. (It is possible that some of these losses represent expenditures by firms hoping to secure monopoly positions from other firms in the industry, as discussed below. These losses are then part of the social costs of monopoly. We attempt to account for them in one of our welfare loss formulae.)
Previous studies, to the extent we can ascertain, have followed Harberger and treated deviations in profits below and above the mean symmetrically.
That is, an industry whose profit rate was 5 % below the mean profit rate was considered to have created as large a welfare loss as an industry whose profits are 5 % above the mean.2 Thus, these studies have not actually estimated welfare loss under monopoly using perfect competition as the standard of comparison, but have effectively compared welfare loss under the present regime with that which would exist were the degree of monopoly equalised across all firms and industries. Under their procedures, a constant degree of monopoly power, however high, would result in no welfare loss. While such an approach has some theoretical support, it raises practical difficulties. How is this elusive concept of a constant degree of monopoly defined and measured? How is such a world created without an omniscient planner or regulator? In addition, 1 Worcester (I 973) makes some allowance for this bias by using go % of the median profit rate, but this adjustment is obviously rather ad hoc.
2 One might believe that the losses by firms earning profits below the norm represent a form of factor surplus loss which must be added to the consumer surplus loss to obtain the full losses from monopoly. But, as Worcester (I 973) has shown, these factor-surplus losses, if properly measured, are an alternative way of estimating the consumer surplus losses and should be used instead of the consumer surplus measure, rather than in addition to it, if used at all.
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[DECEMBER monopoly in product markets could be expected to induce distortions in factor markets. Finally, as developed below, the existence of monopoly power in product markets attracts resources to its acquisition and protection, which are part of the social cost of monopoly apart from the distortions in output accompanying it. For these reasons, and because it appears to be most directly in the spirit of the analysis, we have compared monopoly profits to competitive returns, and considered only deviations above the competitive rate when estimating welfare losses. Following Harberger and other previous studies we have attempted to minimise the transitory component in our estimates by using averages of firm profits over several years.' Nevertheless, some of the companies earning profits above competitive levels in our samples are in temporary disequilibrium, and the welfare losses associated with these firms can be expected to disappear over time. Thus, our estimates of monopoly profits are a combination of both longrun monopoly profits and short-run disequilibrium profits. To the extent the time periods we have chosen are representative of the U.K. and U.S. economies under "normal" conditions, our calculations are accurate estimates of the annual losses from monopoly, both permanent and transitory, that can be expected in these countries. A further effort to eliminate the transitory monopoly components from the data would require a specification of what is meant by "permanent" and "transitory" monopolies. Many economists would take it for granted that in the "long run" all monopolies are dead and thus monopoly like unemployment is a "short run" phenomenon. As with unemployment, the question is how serious is the problem when it exists, and how long does it last. Our paper addresses the first of these questions. A full answer to the second question is clearly beyond the scope of our essentially cross-section analysis.
(C) The Aggregation Biases from Using Industry Data Previous studies of monopoly welfare losses with the exception of Worcester (I973) used industry data at a fairly high level of aggregation. At any point in time some firms in an industry are likely to be earning profits below the competitive level. We have already discussed the methodological issues raised in a study of monopoly welfare losses by firms earning negative economic profits. If our interpretation of these firms as being in short-run disequilibrium is correct, then they should be dropped from an industry before calculating the industry's profit rate. Previous studies which have based their calculations solely on industry data have effectively combined the negative profits of some firms with the positive profits of others in estimating the welfare losses from monopoly. Thus they have implicitly assumed that the monopoly profits earned by the most profitable firms in the industry are somehow offset or mitigated by 1 
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those experiencing transitory losses. But if there is a monopoly problem in an industry, it is represented by the positive rents earned by those firms with profits above the norm, and the losses of firms that are temporarily unable to compete successfully in no way alleviates the social costs arising from the monopoly positions of the other firms. The present study therefore measures monopoly welfare losses using firm level monopoly profit estimates. A second aggregation bias is introduced into the estimates of all previous studies other than Kamerschen's (I966) through the assumption of a constant elasticity of demand across all industries. This results in the profit margin's appearance as a squared term in the welfare loss formula. The use of average firm profit margins (including firms with negative profits) implicit in the use of industry data, further biases the welfare loss estimates downwards. The extent of this bias is measured below.
(D) Welfare Loss in the Acquisition of Monopoly Power Tullock (I967) and Posner (I975) have argued that previous studies understate the social costs of monopoly by failing to recognise the costs involved in attempts to gain and retain monopoly power. These costs could take the form of investment in excess production capacity, excessive accumulation of advertising goodwill stocks, and excessive product differentiation through R and D.' Efforts to obtain tariff protection, patent protection and other types of preferential government treatment through campaign contributions, lobbying or bribery are parts of the social costs of the existence of monopoly as defined by Tullock and Posner. To the extent that these expenditures enter reported costs in the form of higher payments to factor owners and legitimate business expenses, firm costs in the presence of monopoly exceed costs under perfect competition. Estimates of welfare loss based on those profits remaining net of these expenditures underestimate the social cost of monopoly in two ways: first, by understating monopoly rents they understiate the distortions in output monopoly produces; secondly, by failing to include these additional expenditures as part of the costs of monopoly.
Three adjustments to the usual welfare triangle measure of monopoly welfare loss are made to account for the additional expenditures to redistribute monopoly rents, monopoly power induces. First, advertising is added to monopoly profit in calculating the welfare triangle loss to allow for the understatement of monopoly profit expenditures of this type produce. Second, all of advertising is added to the welfare loss. This takes the extreme view of advertising as merely an instrument for securing market power. To the extent advertising provides useful information to consUmers, this measure overstates the cost of monopoly.2 Thirdly, all of measured, after-tax profits above the competitive cost of 1 See Spence (I974). It is interesting to note that this type of activity generally dominates the entrylimiting pricing response. Entry-limiting pricing can be thought of as having extra capacity because of potential entry and actually using it to produce output. Thus the profits associated with restricting output are lost. From this viewpoint we cannot accept Posner's positian that the elimination of entry regulation would eliminate waste. As the probability of entry increases so would the optimal degree of excess capacity. Monopoly pricing would be maintained but social waste would still occur.
2 There will always be an inherent bias in the information provided given the interests of the agent The elasticity of demand is lower at P0 than at PM, and the expansion in output following a reduction in price to competitive price PI is obviously much smaller if we assume the "monopolist" sets price equal to P0. Thus Worcester's depiction of the problem does meet the objections many have raised against the use of the Lerner formula to estimate demand elasticities. We observe only that if one assumes from the start that "monopolists" are so constrained in their behaviour that they must set price so low that marginal revenue is negative, it can be no surprise that calculations incorporating this assumption indicate insignificant welfare losses. But any estimates of welfare losses within a partial equilibrium framework, which impose demand elasticities significantly below those implied via the Lerner formula, must implicitly be assuming that firms set price in such an environment, if the data on price/cost margins are accepted at face value. The latter assumpton may not be valid, however, and its abandonment allows a reconciliation of existing profit-margin data with lower demand doing the advertising so the argument for advertising as a provider of information should not be taken too seriously. Even if we base our welfare measures on post-advertising preferences it is still possible to demonstrate that monopolies (and afortiori oligopolies) invest in too much advertising (see Dixit and Norman, .1975).
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735 elasticity figures without also introducing the assumption that monopolists are either irrational or impotent. The preceding section discusses several business outlays that are made to maintain or preserve monopoly positions. Conceptually these are best treated as investments out of current profits made to secure future monopoly rents than as current production costs as is done for accounting purposes, and is carried through into the economist's calculations based on accounting data. A rational monopolist will not take these into account in making his short-run pricing decision. We can thus reconcile the monopoly pricing assumption with small demand elasticity estimates by assuming that average costs contain much investment-type expenditure and that marginal production costs are below these. In Fig. 2 let CO be observed costs, including investment-type outlays, and PO observed price. For such price and cost figures to be consistent with monopoly pricing behaviour the firm's demand schedule would have to be Do. Price PO would be consistent with a much more inelastic demand schedule, Da say, if actual production costs were at Ca. Note that both profits (7T), and the welfare triangle losses (L) are much larger under the more inelastic demand schedule assumption.
Thus, an alternative procedure for calculating the welfare losses from monopoly to the one described above would be to estimate price/cost margins from data on demand elasticities, where now we estimate demand elasticities from data on price/cost margins. We do not pursue these calculations here. First, because we do not have demand elasticity data applicable to firms, and the imposition of any constant y across all firms is obviously ad hoc. Secondly, the choice of any y in line with existing industry estimates would lead to welfare We believe that reported costs do contain large amounts of investment-type expenditures beyond the advertising we allow for, that production costs are lower therefore, and that individual firm demand elasticities are typically lower than we implicitly estimate. We emphasise, however, that any attempt to take these costs into account, and adjust demand elasticities accordingly, while maintaining the assumption that companies do possess and exercise market power, will lead to larger estimates of welfare loss underlining again the conservative nature of our calculations.
II. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
Empirical estimates of the social cost of monopoly power were obtained for both the United States and United Kingdom. We provide two sets of estimates, one based on our assumptions (AXWI5m), the other based on Harberger-type assumptions (A WH), both measured at the firm-level. For each approach we give a range of four estimates defined in Table I profit since the price and quantity choice of a monopolist should not be affected by a tax on profits. Thus, in contrast to most previous studies, we use beforetax profits to measure the distortion between price and costs under monopoly (the A W's for k = I, 2, 3). However, it is after-tax monopoly profits which provide an inducement to additional expenditures to gain monopoly, and it is these that are added in to obtain our fourth measure of welfare loss. To estimate monopoly profits an estimate of the return on capital of a firm in a competitive industry is needed. Any estimates based on actual returns earned in existing industries run the danger of including monopoly rents. The stock market might be regarded as coming fairly close to satisfying the freeentry and -exit requirement of a competitive industry, however. The returns on corporate stock will include monopoly rents to the extent that they become capitalised over the period for which the rate is estimated. The use of these returns for the United States is therefore equivalent to assuming that (i) all existing monopoly rents are fully capitalised at the beginning of the period, and (2) changes in monopoly rents over the period are accurately anticipated.
For the United States we use as our estimate of the competitive return on capital the Fisher-Lorie index of returns on a fully diversified portfolio of listed stocks for the same period for which our monopoly profit estimates are made (I963-6). This estimate was i2% which might be compared with the average return on capital earned by the firms in our sample of i4%.
For the United Kingdom we use the pre-tax real cost of capital as calculated by Given that inflation in the United Kingdom in I968/9 was substantial, although very much less than in the seventies, we have corrected our data at the company level. Using data from Walker (I 974), we multiplied the profit figure derived from the company accounts by the ratio of the average rate of return at replacement cost to the average rate of return at historical cost and subtracted from this the estimated book value of assets times the cost of capital. The ratio of rates of return used was 9 4: 134 in I968 and 8-2:12-4 in I969. We should in fact be using the'ratio of the rate of return at replacement cost to the rate of return at book value but the latter rate was not available on a comparable basis (see Walker, 1974, table 3 ). This means that our measure of excess profits and therefore of welfare loss will tend to be biased down, given that (a) asset revaluations generally take place at merger, when acquired assets are given a current market valuation, and (b) revaluations, of land and buildings especially, do take place periodically, their frequency being related to the rate of inflation. The cost of capital measure used was the forward-looking, pre-tax measure which was estimated at 8 15 % for the period I968/9 (Flemming et al. 1976 Table 3 . Its entries are made by assigning each firm to an industry at the appropriate level of aggregation, and aggregating over the firms in each industry. Just as negative profit firms were excluded in calculating welfare losses at the firm level, negative profit industries are excluded in calculating welfare losses across industries. For the A WckM measures aggregation bias is due simply to the inclusion of losses by some firms in the calculation of each industry's profits. Table 3 Table  3 Comparison of (B) U.K. Estimates
These have been calculated on the same basis as the U.S. estimates, but since no convenient computer tape was available we contented ourselves with an analysis of the top I03 firms in the United Kingdom for the periods I968/9 and I970/4.1 Over the periods in question these firms were responsible for roughly one-third of the GNP and were therefore proportionally more important than the 734 firms sample from the COMPUSTAT tape for the United States. The time-periods used have been dictated by the availability of data. The basic source has been EXTEL cards but advertising expenditure was estimated by aggregating up from the brand level, using estimates of press and TV
